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THE MINNESOTA LABOR DISPUTES
INJUNCTION ACT
By H. L. MCCLINTOCK*
T HE Minnesota statute' refusing recognition to contracts bind-
ing an employee to refrain from joining a labor union and
regulating the issuance of injunctions in cases arising from labor
disputes was manifestly based, not on the model state anti-injunc-
tion bill,2 but on the Norris-La Guardia Act adopted by Congress,
since it is very largely a literal copy of that act. The federal
statute was enacted after long and careful consideration of the
problems involved and its legislative history and the decisions
under it have been elsewhere discussed.' But not so much atten-
tion has been given to the consideration of the cases arising under
the state statutes or to the special problems which arise because
of the provisions of the federal constitution which affect state
but not congressional legislation, the special provisions of the
state constitutions which may be involved,5 and the relation of
the state statutes to the existing labor law decisions of the particu-
lar state., Since labor controversies in Minnesota have recently
attracted so much attention and have caused so much disorder and
*Law School, University of Minnesota.
1Minnesota, Laws 1933, ch. 416, p. 777, 3 Mason's Minn. Stats. 1936
Supp. secs. 4260-1-4260-15.
-See Witte, The Federal Anti-Injunction Act, (1932) 16 MINNESOTA
LAW RmviEw 638, 658.
3Act March 23, 1932, ch. 90, 47 Stat. at L. 70, 29 U. S. C. A. 101-115,
2 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 29, secs. 101-115.4Witte, The Federal Anti Injunction Act, (1932) 16 MINNESOTA LAW
REVIEW 638-643; Monkemeyer, Five Years of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
(1937) 2 Mo. L. Rev. 1.
'Note (1934) 18 MafINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 184.
'One aspect of the relation of the state statutes to the law previously
ex Lting in the several states having such enactments is considered in
Cooper, The Fiction of Peaceful Picketing, (1936) 35 Mich. L. Rev. 73.
The author summarizes in that article the provisions of the statutes of the
nineteen states which have enacted similar legislation with reference to
injunctions against picketing in labor disputes.
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financial loss, it is worth while to consider the extent to which our
statute has limited the powers which the courts had previously
exercised in these cases.
In adapting the federal statute for adoption as a state law
very few changes were made in it except such obvious ones as
substituting "State" for "United States." The federal provision
that an ex parte temporary restraining order should remain in
force only five days' was changed to a provision that such an
order should be effective until a hearing and decision on the
petition for temporary injunction, which hearing shall be held
within ten days unless the defendants ask for additional time.'
The provision of the federal act is a drastic one, but in view of
the practice of many judges to sign, without careful study of
them, temporary restraining orders as drafted by the plaintiff's
attorneys, and of the fact that the continuance of an erroneous
order in force for even a short time may have a decisive influence
on the outcome of the strike, it is not too drastic." Under the
Minnesota provision, the hearing on the petition for temporary
injunction, even if begun within the ten day period, may often
last for several days, and further time may thereafter elapse before
the decision is rendered. In this respect our statute fails to give
adequate protection against one of the principal abuses of labor
injunction practices.' °
There was omitted from the Minnesota statute the provision
of the federal act denying injunctive relief to a complainant who
has failed to comply with any obligation imposed by law which is
involved in the labor dispute in question, or has failed to make
every reasonable effort to settle such dispute either by negotiation
or with the aid of any available governmental machinery."' In
practice this section has furnished one of the most effective sanc-
tions for the policy of recent federal legislation to require collec-
tive bargaining and peaceful settlement of labor disputes. Employ-
ers have become accustomed to think of an injunction as one of
their most effective weapons against strikers, and the fear of its
7Sec. 7, 29 U. S. C. A. sec. 107, 2 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 29, sec. 107.
8Sec. 7, 3 Mason's Minn. Stats. 1936 Supp. sec. 4260-7.9See Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction 200, 201; Witte,
The Federal Anti Injunction Act, (1932) 16 MINNESOTA LAW RE IEw
638, 653.
lOThe Minnesota provision differs from that in the Clayton Act, Act
Oct. 15, 1914, sec. 17, 28 U. S. C. A. see. 381, 2 Mason's U. S. Code, tit.
28, see. 381, only in fixing the time at ten days, instead of "a reasonable
notice." The Clayton Act provision did not prove to be effective. Frank-
furter and Greene, The Labor Injunction 184-187.
-lSee. 8, 29 U. S. C. A. sec. 108, 2 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 29, sec. 108.
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loss is a strong inducement to the exertion of all reasonable means
to assure themselves it will be available if a strike comes. As a
general rule the federal courts have given full effect to this
provision,' 2 though in one case" it was construed so strictly as
to be almost meaningless, and was held not applicable.
No reason is apparent why such a provision would not be as
appropriate in a state statute as in the federal act. If the dispute
is one in which the federal agencies may interfere, the state may
properly refuse to give extraordinary relief to one who fails to
make use of that agency; if no federal machinery is available for
the settlement of the particular dispute, then previous recourse
to negotiation or voluntary arbitration would be the only condition
required by this provision as a prerequisite to injunctive relief.
Though no court of equity would be apt to hold that an employer
who had not complied with these requirements had unclean
hands which prevented his seeking equitable relief,1 4 the broad
principle underlying the clean hands maxim sustains this require-
ment if we concede the policy of the law to be, as declared in this
statute, to favor collective bargaining between employers and
employees at the expense of the formers' right to run their busi-
nesses in any way they choose. A bill' 5 was introduced in the 1935
session of the legislature and passed the house, to amend section
8 of the Minnesota statute by adding thereto the provisions of
the federal statute with reference to prior efforts to settle labor
disputes before either party may resort to an injunction.
The last section 6 of the Minnesota statute states that the act
shall not be held to apply to policemen or firemen or any other
public officials charged with duties relating to public safety. No
similar provision is found in the federal act. From its position
in the statute, following even the repealing section, it is evident
that it was added to the bill during the course of its legislative
consideration. It may have value as an expression of policy to
distinguish between other labor disputes and those involving public
officers or employees charged with the protection of public safety,
1Monkemeyer, Five Years of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, (1937) 2
Mo. L. Rev. 1, 18-21.
IsUnited Electric Coal Cos. v. Rice, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1935) 80 F. (2d)
1, cert. denied (1936) 297 U. S. 714, 56 Sup. Ct. 590.
14But see Electric Research Products, Inc. v. Vitaphone Corp., (1934)
20 Del. Ch. 417, 171 At. 738, which held that one who had breached a
contract for arbitration, valid under the statute of the state where it was
made, but not applicable to a suit in Delaware, had unclean hands so as not to
be entitled to sue in equity for an accounting.
15H. F. No. 87.
16Sec. 15, 3 Mason's M inn. Stats. 1936 Supp. sec. 4260-15.
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but it is not apt to have any practical effect. Policemen and firemen
generally can advance their interests better by public and political
appeal than by strikes, and even if they do strike, it would rarely
happen that an injunction against them would be of any value.
The term "court of the State of Minnesota" as used in the
statute is defined to mean: "any court of the State of Minnesota
whose jurisdiction has been or may be conferred or defined or
limited by Act of Legislature."' 17 This provision is taken from
the federal statute' without change except for the substitution of
"State of Minnesota" for "United States" and "Legislature" for
"Congress." The purpose of so defining the term "court of the
United States" in the federal statute is plain. The basis for the
entire enactment is the power of Congress to control the juris-
diction of the lower federal courts 9 and it was wise to avoid any
possible invalidity which might result from interference with the
original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, conferred
by the constitution, 20 since it is practically inconceivable that a
suit for injunction in a labor dispute would ever be within that
original jurisdiction. But when such a definition is incorporated
in the Minnesota statute, its effect is radically different. Our
suits for injunction are brought originally in our district courts,
and it is difficult to find any legal justification for saying the
jurisdiction of those courts "has been or may be conferred, or
defined or limited by act of legislature."
Our constitution provides that the district courts shall have
original jurisdiction in all civil cases, both in law and equity, where
the amount in controversy exceeds one hundred dollars and shall
have such appellate jurisdiction as may be prescribed by law. 21
Even if that section does not deprive the legislature of any power
to lessen the jurisdiction of the district court, no one would con-
sider that the statutory definition was framed to include such a
court. If we assume that the legislature intended the meaning
expressed by the definition, we would have to hold that it had
rendered the entire statute substantially valueless by excluding
from its operation the only court which can grant an injunction
in most cases involving a labor dispute. But it is probable that
17Sec. 12(d), 3 Mason's Minn. Stats. 1936 Supp. sec. 4260-12(d).
L8 Sec. 13(d), 29 U. S. C. A. sec. 113(d), 2 Mason's U. S. Code, tit.
29, sec. 113(d).
19United States, constitution, art. 3, sec. 1.
20United States, constitution, art. 3, sec. 2 gives original jurisdiction
to the Supreme Court in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party.
2 1Minnesota, constitution, art. 6, sec. 5.
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the court will, as it should, recognize the legislative history of the
statute, and conclude that the definition of "court" was copied from
the federal act without any consideration of its application to our
court system, and that it should be disregarded rather than given
an effect, the result of which would be to nullify the entire act.22
To remove all uncertainty, the section should be amended by
defining the term "court" so as to include any court. of the state
which has power to issue any injunction.23
Although the Norris-La Guardia Act has been in force for
five years, its validity has not yet been definitely determined by
the United States Supreme Court. Since, however, that court
has denied certiorari to review two cases 24 in which the lower
courts overruled contentions that the act was invalid, and it has
not been held invalid by any court,2" it is reasonable to assume
that it will not be held invalid as a whole. The decisions as to
the validity of the state statutes have not been so uniform. Two
advisory opinions stated that bills pending in the Massachusetts
and New Hampshire legislatures embodying the provisions of the
Norris-La Guardia Act would, if enacted into statutes, be uncon-
stitutional.!" Recently the supreme court of Washington has held
that a similar statute was an invalid encroachment upon the
jurisdiction of a constitutional court.27  The courts of last resort
of Oregon and Wisconsin have sustained the validity of modern
statutes of this sort, - and the supreme court of Illinois has upheld
an earlier, shorter act which limited the power to issue injunctions
! In Dax v. Furniture Workers Local Union No. 1859, (D.C.) Hen-
nepin County (1937) No. 377460, the court, in its memorandum in sup-
port of its order sustaining defendant's motion to dismiss the application for
a temporary injunction, made no reference to the contention of plaintiffs'
counsel that the anti-injunction act did not apply to district courts.
!3The model state anti-injunction bill, as enacted in Wisconsin, Wis-
consin Laws 1931, ch. 376, Wisconsin Stats. secs. 103.51 to 103.63 contains
no provision defining the term "court." But since our statute already con-
tains such a definition it would be better to amend that definition than to
repeal it.
"'Levering v. Morrin, (C.C.A. 2nd. 1934) 71 F. (2d) 284, cert. den.
(1934) 293 U. S. 595, 55 Sup. Ct. 110, 79 L. Ed. 688; United Elec. Coal
Cos. v. Rice, (C.C.A. 7th, 1935) 80 F. (2d) 1, cert. denied (1936) 297
U. S. 714, 56 Sup. Ct. 590.
-
2 fonkemeyer, Five Years of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, (1937)
2 Mo. L. Rev. 1.
2-Opinion of the Justices, (1931) 275 Mass. 580, 176 N. E. 649; Opinion
of the Justices, (1933) 86 N. H. 597, 166 Atl. 640.
27Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., (Wash. 1936) 63 P. (2d)
397.
-'Starr v. Laundry and Dry Cleaning Workers, etc., Union, (Or. 1936)
63 P. (2d) 1104; American Furniture Co. v. I. B. of T. C. & H. of A.,
(Wis. 1936) 268 N. W. 250.
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against peaceful picketing. 9 Lower courts in Louisiana and New
York have applied certain provisions of statutes modeled on the
Norris-La Guardia Act without discussing the question of the
general validity of such statutes. 3 These decisions are, of course,
directly in point on the question whether the Minnesota statute
is in conflict with the United States constitution, but their per-
suasiveness as to its compliance with the state constitution varies
with the similarity of the constitutional provisions considered in
each of the cases with those of our own constitution.
Two radically different sets of problems of validity under
either the federal or state constitutions are presented by different
sections of the act, those involving the provisions which deny all
legal remedies, either legal or equitable, for breach of, or inter-
ference with, the so-called yellow-dog contracts which require an
employee to agree either not to join a union, or to withdraw
from employment if he does ;31 and the other sections of the act
regulating the contents of injunctions in labor disputes and the
procedure by which they may be obtained. Even the extreme to
which the United States Supreme Court went in disregarding the
separability clause of the Guffey Coal Act and holding that the
invalidity of the labor provisions of that act invalidated the entire
act32 would not sustain a contention that the yellow-dog contract
provisions of these anti-injunction acts were inseparable from the
rest of the acts.
In both of the advisory opinions 33 to the effect that acts based
on the Norris-La Guardia Act would be unconstitutional, the
courts stated without much elaboration that the provisions refusing
enforcement to yollow-dog contracts denied due process of law,
citing the United States Supreme Court cases which held that an
act of Congress and state statute which made it a criminal offense
for an employer to exact such a contract from his employees, were
invalid as an unwarranted interference with freedom of contract.
29Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers' International Un., (1934) 358 Ill.
239, 193 N. E. 112, 97 A. L. R. 1318.
3ODehan v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees, etc., Local Union, (La.
App. 1935) 159 So. 637; Aberdeen Restaurant Corp. v. Gottfried, (1935)
158 Misc. Rep. 785, 285 N. Y. S. 832; Thompson v. Boekhout (App. Div.
1936) 291 N. Y. S. 572.31Sec. 3, 3 Mason's Minn. Stats. 1936 Supp. sec. 4260-3.
32Carter v. Carter Coal Co., (1936) 298 U. S. 238, 56 Sup. Ct. 855, 80
L. Ed. 749.33Opinion of the Justices, (1931) 275 Mass. 580, 176 N. E. 649;
Opinion of the Justices, (1933) 86 N. H. 597, 166 Atl. 640.34Adair v. United States, (1908) 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277, 52
L. Ed. 436, 13 Ann. Cas. 764; Coppage v. Kansas, (1915) 236 U. S. 1, 35
Sup. Ct. 240, 59 L. Ed. 441, L. R. A. 1915c 960.
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Similar statutes from other states were held invalid by the state
courts. 35 The Minnesota supreme court has held that the decision
that the federal statute violated the due process clause of the
fifth amendment was conclusive that a similar Minnesota statute
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment."6
Since the enactment of the Norris-La Guardia Act and the state
statutes based upon it, apparently no court has been called upon
to consider the validity of the sections denying protection to
contracts intended to prevent employees from joining any unions.
It has been suggested3 7 that the decisions invalidating statutes
which make the exaction of such contracts by threat of discharge or
refusal of employment criminal offenses do not necessarily control
the validity of statutes which merely refuse all legal recognition
to such agreements, but there is nothing in the reasoning of the
cases to lend support to the distinction. The invalidity of the
statutes was found to inhere in their interference with the con-
stitutional right of freedom of contract, not in the means by which
such interference was effected. Freedom to contract is a mean-
ingless thing if it protects only the privilege of formulating an
agreement, and does not require that the state give any legal
recognition to it after it is formed. But it is probable that few,
if any, courts would today hold that the constitution does guarantee
freedom to an employer to exact such contracts. Changes in the
public attitude toward union membership and the right of collective
bargaining during the past twenty years, and especially during
the past five years, have been too great to permit courts now to
regard an employer as being constitutionally protected in his
privilege of exacting any terms he may choose from those who
may be compelled by economic necessity to accept employment
from him. The widespread unemployment of recent years has
brought home to many who had never before considered it the
fact that a workingman may no longer sell his services to whom
he chooses, on such terms as he may assent to. It is not probable
that the question will often arise; the changing arena and strategy
of the labor conflict has rendered, at least for the present, the
yellow-dog contract an obsolete weapon. If it does arise it is to
be hoped that the courts will sustain the provisions of statutes
35Gillespie v. People, (1900) 188 Ill. 176, 58 N. E. 1007; State v.
Julow, (1895) 129 Mo. 163, 31 S. W. 781; People v. Marcus, (1906) 185
N. Y. 257, 77 N. E. 1073; State ex rel. Zillmer v. Kreutzberg, (1902) 114
Wis. 530, 90 N. W. 1098.
-State ex rel. Smith v. Daniels, (1912) 118 Minn. 155, 136 N. W. 584.37Note (1934) 18 MfINNEsoTA LAW REvimw 184; Note (1935) 13
N. Y. U. Law Quar. Rev. 92.
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denying such contracts legal recognition, on the broad basis that
new conditions have made those statutes a reasonable exercise of
legislative discretion, rather than on any technical distinction
between them and the earlier statutes which were held invalid in
the early years of this century.
If it should be held that denying all remedy for the protection
or enforcement of a contract whose making the state could not
forbid did not deny the freedom of contract protected by the due
process clause, the Minnesota statute would still have to be
reconciled with our constitutional provision that "Every person
is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or
wrongs which he may suffer in his person, property or character." 8
It would seem clear that only a ruling that the legislature reason-
ably can limit freedom to contract against union membership by
employees can-sustain the yellow-dog section of our anti-injunction
statute.
With respect to the provisions regulating the acts which may be
enjoined in cases involving labor disputes, the constitutional
problems raised by our state statute are entirely different from
those raised by the federal statute. The latter applies to courts
created by act of Congress, whose power to diminish their juris-
diction never has been limited, and to courts whose relief is supple-
mentary to that of the state courts, so that it never has been
held that refusal to open them to any group of suitors is a denial
of due process. Whether the limitations imposed on the power
of state courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes violate the
federal constitution, depends on the extent to which the courts
which decide that issue feel bound to follow the broad language
of the United States Supreme Court in Truax v. Corrigan,89 which
held that an Arizona statute modeled after section 20 of the Clay-
ton Act,4" but given a-broader construction by the Arizona supreme
court,41 was contrary to the fourteenth amendment to the federal
constitution. The holding of the majority was that if the statute
was construed as denying all remedy, legal or equitable, for the
protection of employers from non-violent acts of striking work-
men, it denied due process of law; if it was construed as merely
depriving the employer of the protection of an injunction which
would be given to similar interests threatened by similar injuries
3 8 Minnesota, constitution, art. 1, sec. 8.
39(1921) 257 U. S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 66 L. Ed. 254, 27 A. L. R. 375.
4029 U. S. C. A. sec. 52, 2 Mason's U. S. C. tit. 29, sec. 2.
4 1Truax v. Corrigan, (1918) 20 Ariz. 7, 176 Pac. 570.
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where no labor controversy was involved, it denied equal protec-
tion of the laws.
There can be no question that the reasoning underlying that
decision, if accepted without qualification, would require a decision
that all state statutes modeled after the Norris-La Guardia Act
also deny equal protection of the laws, and it was so stated in
both of the advisory opinions rendered in Massachusetts and New
Hampshire. 42  Among the four justices who dissented from the
majority in the Truax Case, was Mr. Justice Pitney, a fact which
indicates conclusively that the dissent was not based entirely on
the economic predilections of the justices. It is highly probable
that this fact, together with the change in public opinion with
reference to the use of the injunction in labor disputes, and the
recognition of the validity of the federal statute, would lead the
United States Supreme Court to-day to recognize that it is
reasonable to place labor disputes in a separate classification with
respect to the issuance of injunctions, so that the entire state
statute would not be held to deny equal protection, even if some
of its provisions might be held to do so. The Wisconsin court, in
upholding its statute,43 construed the decision of Truax v. Corrigan
as dependent on the fact that the strikers in that case resorted to
falsehood and libel in their struggle with the employer, while the
later act would permit such conduct to be enjoined. The Oregon
court4 4 construed its act as merely regulating the procedure for
obtaining an injunction, not as denying the right to it, as the
Arizona statute had been construed to do. Both state cases can
be distinguished on their facts from the Arizona case, but they
cannot be reconciled with the reasoning of the United States
Supreme Court.
If it should be authoritatively decided that a state anti-injunc-
tion statute of the type under consideration did not violate either
the due process or the equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment, the Minnesota supreme court may be expected to
follow that precedent and hold that the statute does not violate
the due process clause of the state constitution, but the additional
provision of our constitution guaranteeing to every person a certain
remedy for all injuries to person or property,45 may still invalidate
42Opinion of the Justices. (1931) 275 Mass. 580, 176 N. E. 649;
Opinion of the Justices, (1933) 86 N. H. 597, 166 AtI. 640.
43American Furniture Co. v. I. B. of T. C. & H. of A., (Wis. 1936)
268 N. W. 250.44Starr v. Laundry & Dry Cleaners, etc., Union, (Or. 1936) 63 P. (2d)
1104.45Minnesota, constitution, art. 1, sec. 8.
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the restrictions on injunction. A similar clause in the New Hamp-
shire constitution was one of several relied upon by the supreme
court of that state to support its advisory opinion that a proposed
anti-injunction act would be invalid. There was no reference to
any similar clause in either of the opinions which have sustained
similar state statutes.4 7  Since the guaranty of remedy appears in
our constitution in addition to the usual due process clause, it
should be construed as adding something to the latter, but it
would be contrary to the whole spirit of our remedial system to
construe it to require the specific relief developed by chancery,
even in those cases where the remedy at law is not adequate. Since
equitable relief has always been regarded as extraordinary and
supplemental, express language should be required to establish a
constitutional right to it in any given case.
48
In the only decision which has held an enacted statute based
on the Norris-La Guardia Act invalid as a violation of a state
constitution, 49 the principal objection was found to be its encroach-
ment upon the judicial power by restricting the jurisdiction of the
superior court, which was given by the state constitution original
jurisdiction in all cases in equity.50 When the Oregon court
sustained a similar statute of that state51 it pointed out that the
Washington decision was not controlling, since the Oregon con-
stitution recognized the power to change the jurisdiction of the
courts by statute. The question could not arise under the Wis-
consin statute, which operates by declaring lawful certain acts
and then prohibiting an injunction to restrain those acts, instead of
merely forbidding the issuance of injunctions to restrain certain
acts whose unlawful character, of any, is not otherwise affected."
The Massachusetts and New Hampshire advisory opinions"3 men-
46Opinion of the Justices, (1933) 86 N. H. 597, 166 At. 640.
4 7Starr v. Laundry & Dry Cleaners, etc., Union, (Or. 1936) 63 P.(2d) 1104; American Furniture Co. v. I. B. of T. C. & H. of A., (Wis. 1936)
268 N. W. 250. It should be noted that the Wisconsin law, Wisconsin, Stats.
103.53, expressly declares to be lawful the acts which the Minnesota statute,
following the Norris-LaGuardia Act, merely protects from injunction. That
radical difference in the two acts greatly lessens the value of the Wisconsin
opinion as a precedent for sustaining the Minnesota statute.48It has never been held that the constitution requires the state to pro-
vide specific equitable relief to protect private property from a taking by
private persons. McClintock, Discretion to Deny Injunction Against Tres-
pass and Nuisance, (1928) 12 MINNESOrA LAW REviEw 565, 572.49Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., (Wash. 1936) 63 P. (2d) 397.5OWashington, constitution, art. 4, sec. 1.51Starr v. Laundry & Dry Cleaners, etc., Union, (Or. 1936) 63 P.
(2d) 1104, 1108.52Wisconsin, Stats. sec. 103.53.53Opinion of the Justices, (1931) 275 Mass. 580, 176 N. E. 649;
Opinion of the Justices, (1933) 86 N. H. 597, 166 Atl. 640.
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tioned no encroachment upon the jurisdiction of the courts by
the bills proposed in those states except by the section limiting
the power to punish for contempt.
The Minnesota constitution conferring jurisdiction upon the
district courts5 4 is very similar to that of Washington. The per-
suasive effect of the Washington decision as authority in Minne-
sota depends upon the previous attitudes of the two courts in
construing their respective constitutional provisions. The majority
opinion of the Washington court quotes55 from four earlier Wash-
ington cases statements concerning the separation of the powers
of the three departments of government, and the independence of
the courts from legislative control, without stating in detail the
facts or holdings of the cases. In three of the cases the power of
the legislature to limit the jurisdiction of courts created by the
constitution was not in any way involved, the questions being
the validity of a legislative divorce,58 the conclusiveness of an
enrolled statute as proof of its proper enactment, 57 and the delega-
tion by the legislature to a city of its power to create inferior
courts.5 The fourth case59 raised the question whether the Water
Code deprived the superior court of jurisdiction to enjoin the
invasion of a private water right. It was held that the statute,
properly construed, did not intend to destroy that power, the
court adding that the legislature could not have done so if it had
intended to do so. The dissenting opinion relied on a case which
held that a statute prohibiting the issuance of an injunction to
restrain the collection of taxes did not unconstitutionally encroach
on the jurisdiction of the superior court in equity, since it provided
an alternative remedy at law which was adequate."'
The judicial treatment of the Minnesota provision differs from
that in Washington principally in that our court has never been
called upon to pass directly upon the validity of a statute which
was attacked as invalid because it took away from a constitutional
court part of the jurisdiction vested in it as a court of equity.
In two Minnesota cases not directly involving the point are dicta
5 4 Mfinnesota, constitution, art. 6, sec. 5.5 5Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., (Wash. 1936) 63 P. (2d)
397, 405.
66 faynard v. Valentine, (1880) 2 Wash. Terr. 3, 3 Pac. 195.
r
7State ex rel. Reed v. Jones, (1893) 6 Wash. 452, 34 Pac. 201, 23
L. R. A. 240.
"In re Cloherty, (1891) 2 Wash. 137, 27 Pac. 1064.55 State ex rel. Roseburg v. Mohar, (1932) 169 Wash. 368, 13 P. (2d)454.
cOCasco Co. v. Thurston County, (1931) 163 Wash. 666, 2 P. (2d)
677, 77 A. L. R. 622.
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that the legislature cannot enlarge or diminish the jurisdiction of
a court created by the constitution. 61 In several cases the court
has considered whether a statute has invaded the function of the
courts. It has held that a statute which, in effect, gives a new
trial in a case already decided by a court is an invasion of the
judicial function;62 as are statutes which attempt to govern the
court's decision on questions before it.63 But in a statute which
authorizes the consolidation of trust companies, a provision that
the consolidated corporation shall succeed as trustee the con-
stituent corporations is not invalid as an invasion of the judicial
power to appoint successors for trustees.6' A statute authorizing
the court to appoint referees in certain cases does not lessen the
jurisdiction of the court, since the referee is himself an officer of
the court and his acts are an exercise of its jurisdiction.5
The legislature can regulate the procedure in the courts, and
a statute which denies to the court power to direct a verdict
against an objecting party, but permits the court to effectuate the
same result in another manner, is merely a regulation of procedure
and not an invalid attempt to deprive the court of jurisdiction.6
Thus there is no precedent in Minnesota to control the decision
whether the provisions of the anti-injunction act which prohibit
the issuance of injunctions to restrain certain acts not made lawful
by the legislature, is an invasion of the constitutional jurisdiction
of our district courts over suits in equity. The persuasiveness of
the Washington decision that it is invalid is much weakened by
the fact that only three judges, out of the eight who participated
in the decision, concurred in the opinion which stressed the
ground of invalidity now under discussion. Two others concurred
in the holding that the statute was invalid, in an opinion relying
mainly on its denial of due process. Three judges dissented.
Under these authorities, there is nothing to prevent our court
from construing these prohibitions as not denying jurisdiction to
61State v. Dreger, (1906) 97 Minn. 221, 106 N. W. 904; Lading v. City
of Duluth, (1922) 153 Minn. 464, 190 N. W. 981.
a2State v. Flint, (1895) 61 Minn. 539, 63 N. W. 1113; Petition of
Siblerud, (1921) 148 Minn. 347, 182 N. W. 168.63Meyer v. Berlandi, (1888) 39 Minn. 438, 40 N. W. 513, (requiring
construction of mechanics lien law in such a way as to give full recovery
to lien claimant); In re Tracy, (1936) 197 Minn. 35, 266 N. W. 88, 267
N. W. 142, (limiting the consideration of misconduct in disbarment pro-
ceedings to that occurring within two years).64First Minneapolis Trust Co. v. Lancaster Corp., (1931) 185 Minn. 121,
240 N. W. 459.65Carson v. Smith, (1860) 5 Minn. 78 (Gil. 58).66Zimmerman v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., (1915) 129 Minn. 4, 151
N. W. 412.
MINNESOTA LABOR INJUNCTIONS
the courts, but merely as rendering erroneous the issuance of an
injunction against the prohibited acts and, therefore, not an in-
vasion of the court's constitutional jurisdiction.
The only one of the procedural requirements of these acts
whose validity has been seriously questioned is the provision that
in proceedings for contempt in cases arising under the act, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a trial by jury. 7  The decisions
of the state courts have been quite uniform in holding that statutes
requiring jury trials in contempt proceedings are invalid,68 but
such a requirement in the Clayton Act,6 9 which gave a jury trial
only in cases where the acts alleged to constitute the contempt
were also crimes, was sustained by the United States Supreme
Court.7 ' There has been no apparent tendency for the state
courts to follow this decision.71 In none of the state cases sustain-
ing acts similar to the Norris-La Guardia Act had there been any
contempt proceedings instituted as yet, so that there was no
occasion to consider the validity of the provisions regarding it.
In the Massachusetts advisory opinion,72 the provision was held
invalid on the authority of a decision on the earlier provision copied
from the Clayton Act. In the New Hampshire opinion,7 3 the
court stated that the provision raised issues which it had not had
time to investigate, and it declined to pass upon them. In the
Washington case in which the statute was held invalid 74 there had
been a prosecution for contempt in which a demand for a jury
trial was denied. The court held that the requirement of a jury
trial in contempt proceedings was an invalid encroachment by the
legislature upon the judicial department. The United States
Supreme Court decision was distinguished on the ground that it
07Sec. 10, 3 Mason's Minn. Stats., 1936 Supp. sec. 4260-10.
6 SSee note (1925) 9 MINNESOTA LAW REviEW 368, 371. In Oklahoma
there is a constitutional right to a jury trial on a charge of indirect con-
tempt.
1938 Stat, at L. 738, see. 22, 28 U. S. C. R. sec. 387, 2 Mason's U. S.
Code, tit. 28, sec. 387.70 Michaelson v. United States, (1924) 266 U. S. 42, 45 Sup. Ct. 18,
69 L. Ed. 162. Note (1925) 9 MINNESOTA LAW REvmw 368.71In Walton Lunch Co. v. Kearney, (1920) 236 Mass. 310, 128 N. E.
429, the court held a provision of a state statute almost identical with that
in the Clayton act to be an invalid encroachment on the constitutional juris-
diction of the courts. In Fort v. Farmers Exchange, (1927) 81 Colo. 431,
256 Pac. 319, the court, in refusing defendant's claim of a right to a jury
trial on the ground that the statutory provision that he "may, upon demand
therefore, be tried by a jury" gave him no right to a jury, stated that a
statute requiring the court to grant a jury trial would be invalid. See
Rogers, Trial by Jury in Contempt Cases, (1930) 2 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 115.
72Opinion of the Justices, (1931) 275 Mass. 580, 176 N. E. 649.
7"Opinion of the Justices, (1933) 86 N. H. 597, 166 Atl. 640.7 1Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., (Wash. 1936) 63 P. (2d) 397.
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dealt with a restriction imposed upon a court created by the
legislature and subject to its full control, and its reasoning did not
apply where the restriction was imposed upon a constitutional
court.
It thus appears that a court which felt bound to follow the
weight of the precedents would be obliged to hold the entire
anti-injunction act, or at least its most important provisions uncon-
stitutional. The only logical basis upon which the act can be
sustained is that the concepts of due process, reasonable classi-
fication and jurisdiction of courts are concepts having a changing
content so that, even though the constitution be not amended, its
effect is modified by changes in the economic and social conditions
to which those concepts are to be applied.
In the only case involving this statute which has so far come
before our supreme court, no question as to the validity of the
statute was raised, and the court contented itself with a brief per
curiam opinion to the effect that the statute did not apply to the
controversy which gave rise to that case75 In a case in the Henne-
pin county district court in which the act was held to be applicable,
the court overruled an objection that it was invalid, principally
upon the assumption that it did not prevent the issuance of injunc-
tions against any unlawful acts, but merely regulated the procedure
by which such injunctions could be obtained.7 6
If our statute is held to be valid, several problems of construc-
tion will have to be considered. 77 The first section deprives the
courts of jurisdiction to issue any injunction in a case involving
or growing out of a labor dispute except in conformity with the
requirements of the act, and prohibits injunctions contrary to the
public policy declared in the act. The second section declares the
public policy which shall govern the interpretation of the act to
be the securing to an employee, though he should be free to decline
to associate with his fellows, of full freedom of association, self-
organization and designation of representatives of his own choos-
ing, free from interference or coercion by his employers in the
designation of such representatives or in self-organization.
75Jansen v. St. Paul M. P. M. 0. Local Union No. 356, (1935) 194
Minn. 58, 259 N. W. 811.76Dax v. Furniture Workers Local Union No. 1859, (D.C. Hennepin
County 1937) No. 377460.
77The federal cases involving the construction of the Norris-La Guardia
Act are reviewed in Monkemeyer, Five Years of the Norris-La Guardia
Act, (1937) 2 Mo. L. Rev. 1. The most recent review of the state cases
construing analogous state statutes is in the Note (1937) 46 Yale L. J.
1064, 1066-1070.
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The supreme court of Wisconsin has held that a similar declara-
tion of policy in its anti-injunction act authorizes an injunction
at the suit of a labor union to restrain an employer from coercing
his employees to prevent their joining plaintiff union.7 ' This
decision has been criticized on the ground that the public policy
is declared only for the purpose of interpreting and applying the
statute,7 9 but it is not logically conceivable that there should be
one public policy applicable when the employer sues to enjoin union
activities, and a different one applicable when the union sues to
enjoin activities of the employer. The declaration of policy was
properly treated as a legislative recognition of the right of em-
ployees to organize and bargain collectively by representatives of
their own choosing in whatever form that right may be asserted.
But this declaration of policy raises one very important ques-
tion with respect to the rights of labor unions. It has been relied
upon by one federal circuit court of appeals to support a holding
that it may restrain picketing by a labor union to compel an em-
ployer to recognize a union as the sole bargaining agent of all
employees, since such a purpose involves coercion of the employees
in the selection of their representatives for bargaining. 0 This
construction of the statute would make all closed shop agreements
contrary to public policy, a result which certainly was not con-
templated by the framers of the statute, nor by the labor unions
which advocated its enactment. Perhaps the general intent to
protect only against coercion by an employer to compel employees
to join company unions might be held to limit the general language
of the declaration of policy, if it were not for the clause "though
he should be free to decline to associate with his fellows." No
similar clause is found in the Wisconsin statute, and none was in
the original Norris bill introduced in the senate.8 ' Its insertion
into the declaration of policy before the enactment of the statute
requires a construction which gives effect to it, that is a con-
struction that it is against public policy for an employee to be
coerced by his employer into joining any union of any kind. The
suggestion that the policy is only concerned with coercion by the
employer, and only the employee, not the employer, can object to
it,$12 does not meet the difficulty. A closed shop agreement between
78Trustees of Vis. State F. of L. v. Simplex Co., (1934) 215 Wis.
623, 256 N. W. 56.79Note (1935) 13 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 92, 100.8OLauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 68.
8'Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction Append. IX, p. 280.
s'Monkemeyer, Five Years of the Norris-La Guardia Act, (1937) 2
Mo. L. Rev. 1, 6.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
an employer and a union whose membership does not include all
of the employees certainly requires coercion by the employer upon
the non-member employees, since he must discharge them if they
exercise their freedom to decline to associate with their fellows.
If, then, the statute protects against injunctions which restrain
only acts in furtherance of the public policy declared in the section
under consideration, it must be held that it makes no change in
the existing law regarding injunctions against strikes or picketing
in an effort to secure or enforce a closed shop agreement.
The limitations on injunctions by restriction of the acts which
may be enjoined 83 and the procedural requirements for the issu-
ance of injunctions84 are both limited to cases involving or growing
out of a labor dispute, and their scope must depend upon the
definition of a labor dispute found in the first three subsections
to section 12 of the statute.85 In these subsections it is first stated
that a case involves or grows out of a labor dispute when it involves
persons in the same craft, trade or occupation, or who have a
common employer or are members of the same or an affiliated
organization of employers or employees, or when the case involves
any conflicting or competing interests in a labor dispute of persons
participating or interested therein. It is manifest that the detailed
designation of specified persons or groups of persons in the first
part of the subsection is unnecessary unless the definitions later
given of "labor dispute" and "person participating or interested"
therein are not broad enough to include all persons or disputes so
designated. The specific designations were properly included to
meet situations in which it had been held the provisions of section
20 of the Clayton Act8" were not applicable.
Subsection (b) defines persons participating in a labor dispute
so as to include everyone against whom relief is sought and who
is engaged in the same craft or industry in which the dispute
occurs, or has a direct or indirect interest therein, or is a member
or agent of any association composed of employees or employers
in such craft or industry. This language seems to be broad
enough to include all possible defendants in any suit which in any
way involves a controversy arising out of labor relations in the
broadest sense. It should be noted that there is no requirement,
expressed or implied, that the plaintiff who seeks relief must also
be a party to the dispute. Thus the act would seem to apply to
83Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., 1936 Supp. sec. 4260-4.84Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., 1936 Supp., sec. 4260-7.
s Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., 1936 Supp., sec. 4260-12(a)-(c).
8629 U. S. C. A. sec. 52, 2 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 29, sec. 52.
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suits by the state to enjoin acts of strikers or their pickets as
public nuisances, or to suits by persons having no connection with
the dispute who may be injured by such acts. So in a case where
striking truck drivers picket gasoline filling stations to prevent the
sale of gasoline to vehicles used to supplant the trucks, the act
should be held to apply to a suit by the filling station proprietors
to enjoin the picketing, even though they are in no way interested
in the dispute. Subsection (c) gives an equally broad definition
of "labor dispute" as including any controversy concerning terms
or conditions of employment, or concerning association or repre-
sentation of persons in seeking to arrange terms or conditions of
employment, "regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of employer and employee."
Notwithstanding the broad language of this statutory definition,
the supreme court of Washington has held that there is no labor
dispute when a retail clerks' union pickets a store to compel the
manager to induce his clerks to join the union.8 7 The court brushed
aside all cases cited by counsel and ignored the language of the
statute, apparently taking judicial notice that a labor dispute could
involve only relations between an employer and his employees,
regardless of what the legislature might define it to include. The
same result has been reached in some of the lower courts, both
federal and state,88 but so far there has been no other court of
last resort which has so limited the application of the statute. It
is true that the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari
to review a case which held there was no labor dispute when the
controversy was between two unions, neither of which was aided
by the employer, 0 but it also denied certiorari in another case from
another circuit where full effect was given to the broad definition
found in the act." The supreme court of Wisconsin has held the
statute applicable where the employer was picketed by a union
after he had permitted his employees to vote freely on whether
they would join the union or not and they had unanimously voted
87Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks Union No. 148, (1935) 184 Wash.
322, 51 P. (2d) 372.
s
8 See Monkemeyer, Five Years of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, (1937)
2 Mo. L. Rev. 1, 23-26; comments (1937) 31 Ill. L. Rev. 691; (1937) 21
MINNrSOTA LAW Rmvpw 467; (1936) 84 U. Pa. L. Rev. 771; and note
(1937) 46 Yale L. J. 1064, 1066.
80United Electric Coal Cos. v. Rice, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1935) 80 F.(2d) 1, certiorari denied (1936) 297 U. S. 714, 56 Sup. Ct. 590, 80 L. Ed.
1000.
SOLevering v. Morrin, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1934) 71 F. (2d) 284, certiorari
denied 293 U. S. 595, 55 Sup. Ct. 110, 79 L. Ed. 688.
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in the negative,9 ' and also where the union was demanding that a
small contractor cease working on the jobs with his employees after
refusing his request that he be permitted to join the union. 92
One case in which the statute has been relied upon has reached
the Minnesota supreme court, and it was held that there was no
labor dispute involved. 93 The facts94 were that plaintiffs, who
owned a motion picture theatre located in a part of the city where
a large number of union men resided, had entered into a contract
to employ only union operators until Sept. 1, 1933. On June 26
of that year they discharged their union operators, and undertook
to operate the machine themselves. Thereupon the union began
to picket the theatre, and also to issue circulars stating that
plaintiffs were unfair to organized labor, and were not co-operating
in the president's re-employment program. Plaintiffs sued for an
injunction. A motion for a temporary injunction was denied, but
after the term of the contract had expired, a permanent injunction
was issued which restrained not only the picketing but also "mak-
ing, uttering, communicating, circulating, posting or publishing
any statements that plaintiffs or plaintiffs' theatre is unfair, or is
unfair to organized labor, or any statement that plaintiffs or their
theatre should not be patronized."
The opinion was delivered per curiam and is extremely un-
satisfactory. The court stated that it was conceded by appellants
that if there had been no contract plaintiffs would be entitled to
an injunction. It was on the basis of the contract that appellants
argued in their printed brief that, even in the absence of the
statute, no injunction should issue, since there was no contract
between the parties in the case in which it had been decided that
picketing as unfair a theatre in which the owner operated his
own machine could be enjoined.99 But to concede that the in-
junction was still proper in the absence of any contract was to
make the entirely unnecessary concession that the anti-injunction
91American Furniture Co. v. I. B. of T. C. and H. of A., (1936) 222
Wis. 338, 268 N. W. 250.92Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, (1936) 222 Wis. 383, 268 N.
W. 270. This case is now pending in the United States Supreme Court.
Note (1937) 46 Yale L. J. 1064, 1065, n. 6.93Jensen v. St. Paul, M. P. 0. Local Union No. 356, (1935) 194 Minn.
58, 259 N. W. 811.94Some of the facts here stated, which are not stated in the very brief
opinion of the court, are taken from the record in the case,
95Roraback v. Motion Picture Machine Operators' Union, (1918) 140
Minn. 481, 168 N. W. 766.
This assumption may be due in part to the common designation of these
statutes as "anti-injunction" acts, a designation which is certainly a mis-
nomer.
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statute had made no change in the existing law. That concession
proved to be immaterial, for the court, assuming there had been a
contract, sustained the injunction for the reason that, after its
expiration, the union had at most an action at law for damages
for the breach of contract, and that it could not have been the
intention of the legislature to permit picketing to enforce a settle-
ment of that cause of action. The lack of attention which the
court gave to the terms of the statute is manifest from the state-
ment that section 12 (c) of that act "defines a labor dispute as any
controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment." Such
a superficial treatment of the act may indicate that the court is
unwilling to give heed to the statute, but it is to be hoped it
indicates only that the court regarded the particular case before
it as not requiring more careful consideration in view of the
change in conditions since the suit was started, and that the opinion
will not be followed as a precedent for future decisions.
In construing these labor injunction statutes the courts ap-
parently have sometimes assumed that the legislature intended
to limit injunctions only in those cases where they would approve
the acts against which the injunctions were sought, and have
construed the definition of "labor dispute" accordingly; but that
assumption is clearly fallacious. In all cases arising out of labor
disputes, injunctions may be issued to restrain numerous acts
that may be committed or threatened, a fact which the sponsors
had to stress repeatedly in their arguments in support of the
bill."' Even where certain acts, such as picketing to give notice
of the facts, are freed from all restraint by injunction, we cannot
assume that the legislature intended to limit the restriction on
power to enjoin to those cases where the acts were directed toward
an end which the legislature or the court might approve. When
the Wisconsin court held that no injunction could be issued to
restrain from peaceful and truthful picketing, as "unfair," of a
tile contractor who worked beside his men, 97 it did not thereby
hold that the union had a right to prevent him from so working,
but only that it could in that manner make public its position in
the controversy without interference by the court in advance. If
the public does not sympathize with the position of the union in
that matter, the picketing will have little or no effect; if any
substantial portion of the public sympathizes with the position of
90See excerpts quoted in United Electric Coal Cos. v. Rice, (C.C.A.
7th Cir. 1935) 80 F. (2d) 1, 8.
07Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, (1936) 222 Wis. 383, 268
N. W. 270.
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the union to the extent of being willing to cease to patronize the
offending employer, the court should not deprive the union of the
aid of such support by preventing all effective means of acquaint-
ing the public with the facts. There is, therefore, no reason of
policy which should lead the courts to restrict the broad language
of the statutory definition of a labor dispute, or to hold that they
may grant injunctions in support of the declared policy against
closed shop contracts without compliance with the provisions of
the act.
Section 4 of the Minnesota statute prohibits the issuance, in
cases growing out of labor disputes, of restraining orders or
injunctions which prohibit any of the acts enumerated in the nine
subsections of the act.98 So far no reported case has dealt with
a request for the issuance of injunctions against any of the acts
specified in any of these subsections except subsection (e), al-
though instances can be found where almost all, if not all, of the
other acts have been enjoined in the absence of statutory restric-
tion. The acts specified in subsection (e), which has caused all the
controversy so far over the construction of this section, are "Giv-
ing publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor
dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any
other method not involving fraud or violence." In many of the
comments on the cases involving an application of this section,
the old controversy as to whether there can be picketing without
intimidation, and whether mass picketing is permissible'9 has been
renewed. It seems that such a discussion is not called for by the
language of the act. The complete omission from the statute of
the word "picketing" after the United States Supreme Court had
largely based one of its most widely criticized constructions of the
Clayton Act on the omission of the word from that act, 10 ought
to be conclusive that the legislature, in passing this act, did not
intend to prohibit injunctions against any form of picketing. Even
if we should give to the word "patrolling," which is used in the
statute, the same meaning as is attached to the more usual term
"picketing," the subsection still does not prohibit an injunction
against all patrolling, but only against giving publicity to the facts
by patrolling.
In other words, this subsection does not purport to affect the
98Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., 1936 Supp. sec. 4260-4.
99See Cooper, The Fiction of Peaceful Picketing, (1936) 35 Mich.
L. Rev. 73.
lOOAmerican Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, (1921)
257 U. S. 184, 42 Sup. Ct. 72, 66 L. Ed. 189, 27 A. L. R. 360.
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power to enjoin patrolling for any purpose other than to apprise
the persons interested and the general public of the nature of the
controversy. Certainly it would seem that the power to enjoin
the picketing of customers of the adverse party in furtherance of
a secondary boycott, if it existed before the enactment of the
statute,""' and the power to enjoin the picketing of the residences
of strikebreakers to coerce them into leaving their jobs10 2 can-
not be affected by a statutory restriction on restraint of giving
publicity to the facts of the controversy by patrolling. It would
also seem that any existing rule authorizing injunctions to limit
the number of pickets who may be maintained for the purposes
of ascertaining who are working as strikebreakers and of contact-
ing them to persuade them to join the strike, would be unaffected
by this prohibition. If the power to enjoin mass picketing for
these purposes is affected by the statute, it must be, not by sub-
section (e) of the section under discussion, but by subsection (f)
which prohibits an injunction which restrains "Assembling peace-
ably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their interests
in a labor dispute." Even as to this subsection, it would be reason-
able for the court to hold that if the legislature had intended to
include assembling in the vicinity of the employer's plant for the
purpose of thereby influencing the conduct of strikebreakers, it
would have used language which more clearly expressed that
purpose. It would certainly be unreasonable to hold that the legis-
lature, by the use of such general language, intended to prohibit in-
junctions against the massing of pickets around an employer's plant
in such numbers as to prevent access thereto by strikebreakers,
even though no physical violence is used because the numbers make
a successful resort to force by the strikebreakers obviously hope-
less.
It thus appears that if the court places the proper construc-
tion upon the terms of this section of the act, as it was enacted by
the legislature, no very great change will result from it in our
law governing the use of injunctions in labor disputes. The only
decision which would seem to be affected is the decision that
picketing a theatre as unfair because the owner ran his own motion
picture machine instead of employing a union operator may be
'
0oSee Gray v. Building Trades Council, (1903) 91 Minn. 171, 97 N. W.
663, 1118, 63 L. R. A. 753, 103 Am. St. Rep. 477, 1 Ann. Cas. 172.102See State v. Zanker, (1930) 179 Minn. 355, 229 N. W. 311; State v.
Perry, (1936) 196 Minn. 481, 265 N. W. 302. The latter case did not
construe the 1933 statute governing injunctions in labor disputes, since it,
like the earlier case, was a prosecution for violation of a city ordinance.
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enjoined." 3 Such a controversy clearly comes within the broad
definition of a labor dispute, and the patrolling is merely to give
publicity to the existence of a labor dispute. It should, of course,
forestall any development of the tendency manifested by our court
in that case to adopt the Massachusetts practice of examining the
objectives sought to be attained by a strike and enjoining all activi-
ties in the prosecution of a strike not directed toward justifiable
objectives, unless it should be held that the declared policy to
protect the right of the employee to decline association with his
fellows is strong enough to write in an exception from the act
of cases where the strike or picketing is to enforce a closed shop.
Probably the most important provisions of the act from a prac-
tical point of view are those to be found in sections 7 to 11 inclu-
sive, regulating the procedure in issuing and enforcing injunctions
in labor disputes. The unnecessary issuance of the ex parte re-
straining order, the preliminary injunction issued upon fact find-
ings based on affidavits which are generally drawn by counsel to
include as much that is favorable to his case as the witness can be
induced to sign by the use of involved and technical language
whose full import the witness does not grasp, and the framing of
injunctions of all kinds in verbose language, whose implications
may be extended to cover many things the court would not inten-
tionally prohibit, are abuses in injunctive procedure not confined to
any one class of cases, but which perhaps have more serious con-
sequences in labor suits than in any other class of cases.105 While
many courts have manifested a tendency to disregard these pro-
cedural requirements or to be satisfied with only a nominal com-
pliance with them,10 6 there can be no justification for such a prac-
tice. The requirements of these sections are specific and detailed,
permitting only an irreducible minimum opportunity for possible
different constructions, and the objective, and many, if not most,
of the specific requirements, are in full accord with the principles
laid down by the greatest equity judges to govern the use of in-
junctions to secure to one party the protection essential to the
preservation of his rights, without exposing the other to any
greater danger of injustice than is unavoidable.
'
0 3Roraback v. Motion Picture Machine Operators Union, (1918) 140
Minn. 481, 168 N. W. 766.
'
01Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., 1936 Supp. sec. 4260-7 to 4260-11.
'
05See Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction cl. 2, pp. 47-81
for a study of the defects of injunctive procedure and their consequences in
labor controversies. Compare the opinion of Amidon, J. in Great Nor. Ry.
Co. v. Brosseau, (D.C. N.D. 1923) 286 Fed. 414.lOoSee note (1937) 46 Yale -L. J. 1064, 1068.
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The construction and application of these procedural sections
ought not to be influenced by the fact that the purpose of the activi-
ty of the defendant employees or their union is to enforce a closed
shop contrary to the policy declared in the statute, nor by the
fact that they may have previously been guilty of acts of violence,
since their purpose is not to protect the defendants against any
proper injunction that the situation may call for, but only to
provide a procedure by which the injunction may be framed and
issued so as to meet the needs of the situation without inflicting
upon them any deprivation of the exercise of the privileges
which the law has reserved to them.
If the above conclusions are correct, it is evident that the
statute will not secure to labor all that it expected to gain from
its enactment. Many comments upon it seem to proceed upon the
assumption that the courts ought to give full effect to the expecta-
tions of those who framed the bill and secured its enactment and
condemn all decisions which are found not to accord with that
assumption. But, after all, the legislative intent to which the
courts ought to give heed, is not the intent of the framers of the
bill who, in order to avoid or lessen opposition, used language
which expressed less than they would like to achieve, or even
accepted amendments which conflicted with their general intent,
but the intent of those who approved the language of the bill in its
final form. Labor leaders may justly complain that in many cases
the courts have failed to give full effect to labor legislation be-
cause they felt it conflicted with the judge's conceptions of a wise
policy with respect to the problems involved; they cannot now
consistently expect the courts to strain the language of a statute
as enacted so as to make it accomplish results which they did not
dare to ask the legislature to incorporate into the statute in clear
language. An amendment of the declaration of public policy so
as to exclude its present condemnation of closed shop agreements
ought to be enacted. While the law ought not, at present at least,
to exert any coercion on employers to enter into such contracts, it
should not stigmatize as against public policy contracts to that
effect entered into by an employer and a union in those situations
where that form of agreement offers the best solution for labor
disputes.
But even though the statute does not accomplish all that was
expected from it, it ought to result in very substantial gains
in labor's struggle to advance from the position it occupied in the
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first half of the Nineteenth Century, when any combination of
employees to better their working conditions was a criminal con-
spiracy, to a position where it can meet employers on substantially
equal terms in bargaining for the distribution of the profits of
industry. Experience with the operation of this statute will un-
doubtedly be invaluable in pointing out the lines along which future
advances may be made.
